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ABSTRACT 
In this paper 1 suggest that L2 research could provide answers to questions concerning the 
structure of L1 grammars that cannot, as a matter of logic, be answered by only examining L1 
data and intuitions. In other words, L2 data from an individual P can provide 'external' evidence 
bearing on the structure of P's L1 grammar, Ll,. This type of evidence will be particularly 
welcome where competing theories of Ll, are extensionally equivalent where they generate the 
sarne output representations. 1 am proposing, therefore, that L2 research need not restrict itself 
to maintaining consistency with work in theoretical linguistic modeling. Instead L2 research can 
itself make unique contributions to the general theory of grammar. 
In addition to potentially leading to fruitful results, the issues that provide the background 
to the discussion warrant examination on other grounds, since they help clarifj the goals of 
linguistic research and the compatibility of various frameworks of linguistic theory with their 
own stated goals. 
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1. THREE PROBLEMS 
From the linguistic viewpoint the problem facing a child is to acquire the grammar determined 
by the innately given language faculty' (Universal Grammar) in conjunction with the input 
provided by the environment, also referred to as 'experience'. It is perhaps misleading to cal1 this 
a 'problem' since al1 evidence indicates that the child learns language as effortlessly as it grows 
hair and gets taller (as pointed out over the years by Chomsky). However, 1 will refer to the 
acquisition of a grammar as the HUMAN'S PROBLEM as a rhetorical convenience to compare it 
with two other processes. 
These two other processes correspond to two distinct research programs carried out by 
professional linguists. However, we shall see that linguists, themselves, are not always clear 
about which of these tasks they are engaged in. One topic of research can be called the 
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE PROBLEM, and it belongs to sub-branches of linguistics like Natural 
Language Processing and Speech Recognition. Such work attempts the simulation of human 
intelligence in recognizing and processing linguistic data without regard to whether or not, the 
model matches the computational methods used by humans. A model that perfectly matched the 
input-output mappings of a human in some domain of linguistic behavior would be called 
'weakly equivalent' to the system actually used by the human. Such a model will generate the 
same utterances as the human, say, but may do so using completely different algorithms. In such 
a case we can also say that the human's grammar and the simulation grammar are 
EXTENSIONALLY equivalent in that; they generate the same surface pattems. They are not 
INTENSIONALLY equivalent, in that they arrive at these pattems via different algorithms, and 
perhaps encode different types and levels of representation. 
The third issue to discriminate corresponds to the research program of generative 
linguistics in the Chomskyan mentalist tradition. For convenience, but perhaps at the risk of 
alienating linguists working in other traditions, 1 refer to this research program as the LINGUIST'S 
PROBLEM. The Linguist's Problem involves figuring out which mental grammar an individual 
has intemalized using the typically insufficient and indeterminate dataavailable. In other words, 
the Linguist's Problem is to figure out what the solution to the Human's Problem is. The purpose 
of this paper is to suggest a way of enriching the generative linguist's data set. If valid, this 
source of data will contribute in a modest way to progress on the Linguist's Problem. To restate 
things in a slightly different fashion, the (generative, mentalist) linguist's constructed grammar 
is intended to be the best hypothesis currently available conceming the nature of the solution to 
the Human's Problem. 
We summarize in (1) the discussion thus far: 
(1) Three Problems that need to be distinguished 
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The Human 'S Problem: Acquiring the grammar determined by UG + Experience. 
The A l  Problem: Simulation ofhuman intelligence without regard to whether the model 
proposed matches the computational methods used by humans (weak equivalence). (See 
Pylyshyn 1984, Chapter 4.) 
The Linguist's Problem: Using insufficient/indeterminate data, figuring out which 
grammar a human acquires. 
It is clear that the tradition of using the term 'grammar' in a systematically ambiguous fashion 
to refer both to the knowledge state of an individual's language faculty and to a linguist's model 
of that knowledge is potentially confusing. In the former usage a 'grammar' is taken to be an 
object in the world (the solution to the Human's Problem), whereas the latter usage implies a 
possibly incomplete and inaccurate model of such an object (the current solution to the Linguist's 
Problem). 
Quine (1972) claimed that it is incoherent to attempt to choose among competing 
grammatical models that are extensionally equivalent, since, by definition they are indistinct with 
respect to the set of utterances they generate. However, Chomsky (1986) argues that Quine's 
pessimism is unwarranted. First, the object of study within the Chomskyan program is 'I- 
language', the system of knowledge internalised in individ~~al mindslbrains. Thus, even if we 
cannot determine the exact form of an individual's 1-language, this does not imply that there is 
not a coherent answer to the question of which grammar it is. Our ability to find the correct 
answer, and the existence of a correct answer, are logically independent issues. 
Furthermore, the choice among extensionally equivalent grammars may be broachable 
not only in principle, but in practice, as well. As Chomsky points out, our theories of differentL1 
grammars should be mutually constraining, since, although partially determined by experience, 
each is a development from the same initial state (S,) of the language faculty (UG): 
Because evidence from Japanese can evidently bear on the correctness of  a theory of  SO, it can have 
indirect-but very powerful-bearing on the choice of  the grammar that attempts to characterize the 
1-language attained by a speaker of  English. 
Chomsky (1986: 38) 
So, not only is the question of the linguist's choice among competing models of grammar a valid 
one in principle, but there are empirical facts that can bear on this choice. 
To make the discussion more explicit, consider the following idealized situation. Imagine 
we could model the structure and acquisition of Japanese in two competing ways, involving two 
theories of S,, UG, and UG,, and two resulting models of the adult grammars based on these 
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models of S,, J, and Jp respectively. Now imagine we could similarly model the structure and 
acquisition of English in two cornpeting ways, involving two theories of S,, UG, and UG,, and 
two resulting models of the adult gramrnars based on these models of S,, E, and E&, respectively. 
At this point, the best theory of the hurnan language faculty would be one that posited UG, as the 
correct model of S,, and the associated Jp and E, as the correct models of the 1-languages of 
Japanese and English speakers. The study of the structure and acquisition of English and the 
study of the structure and acquisition of Japanese should be mutually constraining. The goal of 
linguistics is not rnerely to simulate Japanese and English type output. However, we will now 
see that some current theoretical work is tending in this direction, apparently unintentionally. 
11. RICHNESS OF THE BASE AS A CONFUSION OF GOALS 
It appears that Optirnality Theory (Prince & Smolensky 1993, McCarthy & Prince 1993 Kager 
1999) has tacitly, and perhaps inadvertently, rejected the distinction between the three Problerns 
in (1) by adopting the principie of RICHNESS OF THE BASE (RoB) as a central tenet of the theory. 
According to Kager (p. 19), RoB dernands that "no specific property can be stated at the 
leve1 of underlying representations". There are no restrictions against certain sequences of 
segments or against certain feature cornbinations, in fact there are no morpheme structure 
constraints (MSC's) of any kind. 
Kager (p. 3 1-32) shows that, using any combination of nasal and non-nasal vowels in 
underlying forms, a single OT constraint ranking for English could generate the correct output 
forms [szd] 'sad' and [s%nd] 'sand' . That is, the ranking produces the right output for any of 
the lexicons in (2): 
(2) Ranking: *V,,,-N >> *V, >> IDENT-IO(nasa1) 
INPUT OUTPUT 
LEX 1 : /s%d & /s%ndi > [szd] & [sknd] 
L E X ~ :  / s z d  & /s%ndi > [szd] & [sknd] 
L E X ~ :  /szedi & Iszndi > [szd] & [s%nd] 
L E X ~ :  /szed/ & /szend/ > [szed] & [s%nd] 
The most highly ranked constraint is violated when an oral vowel occurs directly before a nasal 
consonant. The next constraint is violated by the appearance of nasal vowels in output forms. The 
lowest constraint demands input-output identity for the feature [nasal]. This is typical of how OT 
generates allophonic variation: a context-sensitive markedness constraint is ranked above a 
potentially conflicting context-free rnarkedness constraint; and both are ranked above a relevant 
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faithfulness constraint. Without being tied to a unique view of what the lexical items are, the 
proposed ranking generates the right results. 
It is not completely clear what Kager's data is meant to show. One possibility is that the 
grammar licenses al1 of these derivations, they are al1 equally 'psychologically real'. Another 
possibility is that the data is meant to show that severa1 extensionally equivalent choices exist, 
and that there are no grounds for choosing among them. In other words, it is unclear whether a 
theoretical point conceming the nature of grammars is being made, or whether the point is a 
metatheoretical one concerning the limits of our knowledge. In fact, Kager's discussion is a 
useful demonstration of an interesting mathematical property of OT grammars, but 1 will argue 
that it is psychologically uninteresting. 
Before proceeding to the relevance of RoB to the three Problems, it is worth pointing out 
that it is odd to consider RoB as apart of OT. RoB actually just lists properties that other theories 
may have, but OT does not. There is an infinitely long list of properties that any particular 
version of OT does not have. For example, none have lust or interest rates, but we clearly do not 
want to encode this infinite list explicitly in finite human minds. This problem of defining 
grammars in negative terms is discussed further in Reiss (2000). 
However, there are more insidious aspects of RoB. These include explicit appeals to this 
non-principie, as well as the fact that some OT analyses are dependent upon RoB not being valid. 
That is, they only make sense if MSC's and constraints on underlying phoneme inventories are 
included in the grammar! 
McCarthy (1999a:6) invokes RoB to avoid selecting a single underlying representation 
for a given morpheme: "with faithfulness bottom-ranked, the choice of input [among three 
alternatives] doesn't matter, since al1 map to [the same surface form]. So there is no need to 
restrict the inputs." McCarthy has solved the Artificial Intelligence Problem, since his constraint 
ranking generates the same (correct) output representation for al1 three of the input f o m s  he 
considers. However, generative linguistics is not Artificial Intelligence, and McCarthy turns his 
back on the Linguist's Problem by claiming that the choice between competing input forms 
"doesn't matter". The Human leamer must have stored something, and it is the phonologist's job 
to te11 us what. 
We could, following McCarthy, also posit that there may be bananas, not representations 
of bananas, but actual bananas, in the underlying representation of words. Since the language 
faculty presumably cannot assign a pronunciation to a banana, we never get direct evidence that 
the banana is there. It seems perverse to leave the door open to the possibility that it 'doesn't 
matter' whether we choose the bananaful or the banana-free representation, but this is basically 
what McCarthy is doing. 
Generative grammar as cognitive science is interested in the solution to the Human's 
Problem: if McCarthy is right in saying that the choice among underlying f o m s  does not matter, 
then cognitive science does not matter. 1 assume that we can reject this possibility. What 
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McCarthy is doing is confusing various issues in advocating no restrictions on inputs. 
There is no question of 'restricting' the inputs in the sense of positing MSC's as part of 
the grammar, but rather a question of figuring out which inputs the learner constructs given the 
observed data. It is something of a pemersion of terms to label our hypothesis about what the 
LAD does a 'restriction', when in fact we mean 'arriving at a solution, given data and a learning 
algorithm'. 
A supposed benefit of incorporating RoB in a theory of grammar is that the surface 
inventory (both in phonology and morphosyntax) is then taken to be predictable from the 
constraint ranking. This is taken as support for the notion that differences among languages 
reduce to differences in ranking. Consider two more discussions of RoB in the OT literature: 
The set of possible inputs to the grammars of al1 languages is the same. The grammatical inventories 
of languages are defined as the forms appearing in the structural descriptions that emerge from the 
grammar when it is fed the universal set of al1 possible inputs. Thus, systematic differences in 
inventories arise from different constraint rankings, not different inputs. The lexicon of a language 
is a sample from the inventory of possible inputs; al1 properties of the lexicon arise indirectly from 
the grammar, which delimits the inventory from which the lexicon is drawn. There are no morpheme 
structure constraints on phonological inputs, no lexical parameter that determines whether a language 
has pro. 
Tesar R Srnolensky (1998: 252) 
We can also see that it is inevitable that light do exists in [English], given the constraint rankings. 
Grirnshmv (1997: 387) 
It is apparent that RoB gets things exactly wrong: if we accept an OT model of grammar, then 
the inventory present in the PLD will determine how the learner ranks the constraints. Al1 
learners start out with the same constraints in the same ranking relationships (under an OT view 
of UG). The way learners come to acquire different grammars is due to the differences in their 
experience-the inventories they are exposed to. This confusion of cause and effect reflects more 
general problems with existing models of acquisition in OT discussed by Hale & Reiss (1998). 
If we can now agree that we care about making hypotheses about what constitutes 
knowledge of language, and how that knowledge comes to be instantiated in human minds -and 
not just what can make a system act like it has knowledge of language- then we are ready to 
tackle the vexing problem of HOMOPHONY in natural language. 
111. HOMOPHONY IN PHONOLOGY 
The practice of phonological and morphological analysis involves modeling two kinds of 
situation: (a) deriving surface distinctions from identical substrings of underlying representations; 
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and (b) demonstrating that identical surface strings can correspond to underlyingly distinct 
representations. In phonology, these two aspects of analysis are fairly well understood. The first 
(a) is achieved by positing context-sensitive processes which selectively affect parts of 
representations in accordance with the contexts in which they appear, and the second (b) by 
positing neutralization processes. 
(3) Phonological analysis 
a. One-to-many mappings -4eriving surface distinctions from identical inputs-context 
sensitive processes. 
b. Many- to-one mappings -4emonstrating that identical surface strings can correspond 
to underlyingly distinct representations-neutralization processes (phonologically-based 
homophony) 
After illustrating these two phonological patterns, we will turn to their correspondents in 
morphology. 
111.1 Phonological relationships in Old Icelandic 
A simple case of the derivation of a surface distinction from a single underlyingly representation 
is provided by the Old Icelandic noun paradigms in (4). 
(4) Assimilation of -r to coronal sonorant (Reiss 1994) 
Masculine nouns of this class bear the suffix -r in the nominative singular and no overt suffix in 
the accusative singular: heim-r/heim 'home nom./acc. sg.', arm-r/arm 'arm nom./acc. sg'. The 
masculine singular marker assimilates to a preceding coronal sonorant under certain well-defined 
conditions (see Reiss 1994 for an analysis), so that the nominative singular of the stem stein- 
'stone' is steinn and the accusative is stein. We thus see that the surface distinction between 
nominatives with -r and nominatives with gemination of the final coronal sonorant can be 
derived phonologically from a single underlying suffix. 
Compare this situation to that of stems ending in a consonant cluster of increasing 
case 
NOM 
ACC 
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'home' 
heim-rl + heimr 
heim-í31 + heim 
'stone' 
lstein-rl + sleinn 
Istein-631 + slein 
'wagon' 
lvagn-rl + vagn 
lvagn-01' vagn 
sonority, like vagn- 'wagon' and fugl- 'bird'. Here the nominative suffix is deleted. Like the case 
of gemination just discussed, this deletion process is purely phonological. The nominatives are 
vagn and fugl, not Sagnr,  *fuglr or Sagnn, *fugll. In other words, the nominative ends up being 
identical with the accusative in its overt phonetic realization: the nominative and accusative are 
homophonous. However, common practice, and common sense too, te11 us that there are two 
different sets of morphosyntactic features corresponding to each string + m e  marked nominative 
(e.g., v a g n [ ~ o ~ ] )  and one marked accusative (vagn-[Acc]). The surface homophony, or 
ambiguity, in such a situation is derived. 
Instead of accepting the phonological account of the homophony of the nominative and 
accusative of vagn-, we might propose that masculine nouns take the nominative ending -r, 
except in the case of stems ending in certain clusters. However, it then would be treated as an 
accident that these clusters can be described as a natural class using universally required 
linguistic primitives. And we might predict that any random list of stem shapes could be similarly 
exceptional. The ability to capture generalizations is a standard argument against adopting such 
a hypothesis. 
IV. HOMOPHONY IN MORPHOLOGY 
In morphology, situation (a), in which surface distinctions between strings which overlap in 
meaning or morphosyntactic distribution, but which cannot be derived from the 'lower' 
phonological level, is attributed to one of two causes. Either we are looking at a case of root 
suppletion (ai), or else the overlap in meaning results from the concatenation of one constant 
element with different lexical items in different contexts (aii). 
(5) Morphological analysis 
a. One-to-many mappings d e r i v i n g  surface distinctions from identical inputs 
i. root suppletion: go/went 
ii. context dependent suppletion of inflectional morphemes: Hungarian hajó-k 
'boats' hajó-i-m 'my boats' 
h. Many-to-one-mappings demonstrating that identical surface strings can correspond 
to underlyingly distinct featural representations, or alternatively, demonstrating that the 
inputs are actually identical-the problem of morphological homophony. 
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As noted, example (5ai) represents typical root suppletion. The present and past tense forms of 
this verb are not synchronically relatable by productive morphological or phonological processes. 
Example (5aii) is in essence identical to the preceding one, and is separated here only because 
such cases are not typically referred to as suppletion. The plural marker on Hungarian nouns is 
-ok (or harmonic variants) on nouns that are not marked with a possessive suffix, but the plural 
marker is -i- when the noun also bears a possessive suffix. Thus, the choice of marker depends 
on the morphological context. The difference is that unlike went, Hungarian -i- does not express 
in an unanalyzable unit a combination of root and inflectional features. 
The principles of linguistic analysis in situation (5b) are most difficult to explicitly 
characterize. This is the situation where potentially distinct morphosyntactic structures are 
realized by identical phonological strings. Often the crucial question is actually whether or not 
the phonological constant does correspond to multiple morphosyntactic structures. In other 
words, our understanding of the treatment of potential HOMOPHONY is unacceptably vague. The 
present paper does not attempt a thorough treatment of morphological homophony. Instead, 1 
will define this type of homophony, demonstrate that it in fact exists, and then suggest how L2 
data could help us to recognize it. 
An example, again from Old Icelandic, will help. This language distinguishes up to four 
cases overtly in noun paradigms. The nominative and accusative have already been mentioned. 
In addition, there are overtly marked genitives. A full paradigm for the masculine noun 'home' 
is given in (6). 
(6) A masculine noun paradigm 
SINC. PLUR. 
heimr heimar 
heims heima 
In contrast to the masculines, Old Icelandic never distinguishes nominative and accusative in 
neuter nouns, either in the singular or the plural, as illustrated by the paradigm for the noun 
meaning 'ship' in (7). In this particular case, singular and plural forms are identical, but this is 
not the case for al1 neuter nouns. 
DAT. 
ACC. 
(7) A neuter noun paradigm 
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heimi 
heim 
heimum 
heima 
The question now arises whether Old Icelandic has, for example, just one singular form skip that 
is neither nominative nor accusative but shares the features common to both usages, or two 
separate forms, one nominative and one accusative, that happen to be homophonous. The first 
possibility will be referred to as the theory of vague or general representations. The vague 
representation would be something like this: skip-[SG NOUN A N I M A T E ] .  Implicit in this view is 
a theory of underspecification -surface forms may be partially underspecified for the features 
of the morphosyntactic context into which they are inserted. The second possibility will be 
referred to as the theory of ambiguous or homophonous representation. The string skip would be 
part of two distinct representations: s k i p - [ ~ ~ M  SG NOUN ANIMATE] and skip-[Acc SG NOUN 
A N IM A T E ] .  The first three terms (vague, general, ambiguous) are discussed by Bresnan (1 999, 
q.v. for references) who adopts the stand that grammars make great use ofvague representations, 
This choice allows Bresnan to incorporate her underspecified representations into a theory of 
formal markedness. 
According to Bresnan (1997), the use of vague or general interpretation means that 
unspecified features are necessarily absent from a representation; and ambiguous interpretation 
refers to a situation with a set of (potentially) overlapping structures which differ with respect 
to certain features. 1 adopt the term ambiguous in deference to tradition, but in fact the term 
involves a mixing of levels of analysis. A phonological string is called 'ambiguous' if it 
corresponds to more than one morphosyntactic feature structure. Taken as a linking of a 
phonological representation and a morphological feature structure, lexical items cannot be 
ambiguous. Instead we are just looking at homophony. So 'ambiguous' can be read as a synonym 
for homophonous in the following discussion2. 
A third logical possibility exists, in addition to vague and ambiguous representations. 
This view is less often considered in the morphological literature and it holds that there may exist 
a single form which is specified for features that are compatible with al1 contexts in which a 
string appears. For example, the string skip corresponds to a feature structure which is both 
nominative and accusative. This third alternative will not be considered below, but see Dalrymple 
and Kaplan (2001) for interesting arguments in favor of this view. For now, we concentrate on 
the first two possibilities in the Icelandic case and in similar cases from a variety of languages. 
Note that the three views sketched here are not mutually incompatible. Languages could 
possibly contain representations of al1 three types. However, the task of the linguist will be to 
NOM. 
GEN. 
DAT. 
ACC. 
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SING. 
skip 
skips 
skipi 
skip 
PLUR. 
skip 
skipa 
skip 
skip 
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discover the principles goveming the nature of a representation in each particular instance. 
Ultimately these principles should be defined in terms of the leaming path of language 
acquisition. ln this paper, 1 am concemed with merely identifiing the problern and suggesting 
a potentially useful source of relevant data. 
Before proceeding, it is worth distinguishing an issue which is related to, but not identical 
to the issue under discussion. This is the issue of phonologically null rnorphernes. For example, 
we could imagine the existence of a stored lexical item skip which has no case or number 
features, and only receives thern in combination withpotentially phonologically null inflectional 
affixes. Altematively, we could imagine that a form skip is stored with inherent case and number 
features matching those contexts in which the form is inserted. For our purposes, we can often 
sidestep this issue, since our primary concem is to compare the morphosyntactic features 
associated with actually occurring pronounced words. This discussion must be clearly fine-tuned 
for compatibility with different theories of morphology. 
V. TWO LOGICAL EXTREMES 
V.1. Radical vagueness 
An extreme version of the theory of vague representations, which is probably not explicitly held 
by any scholar, could be formulated as follows: 
(8) Radical vagueness 
There is no homophony (other than that which can be derived phonologically). In a given 
language, a single underlying phonological representation (input to the phonology, UR) 
E corresponds to a single rnorphosyntactic feature description which subsumes the 
description of al1 the morphosyntactic environments in which E can appear. 
According to radical vagueness, there is just one Old Icelandic word (that is, one featural 
representation) skip that denotes nominative and accusative for both singular and plural. This 
seems plausible enough, but radical vagueness has other implications. 
It is obvious that if we admit the existence of phonologically null morphemes, then 
radical vagueness will require that each language contain only a single one. This is because 
phonologically null rnorphemes will always have the sarne (null) underlying representation, and 
any two would thus be homophonous, contra radical vagueness. 
Even if we exclude the case of phonologically null morphemes, we can still demonstrate 
that (8) is untenable. It would require that the phonological string found in English well 
correspond to a single lexical entry. In other words, the noun in a deep well and the adverb in I 
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sing well would have to be stored with a single vague set of rnorphosyntactic features that were 
compatible with both uses. The existence of clear, accidental homophony in natural language, 
as well as the fact that it is unlikely that appropriate featural representations could be constructed 
for a single lexical itern like well in this rnodel, rnake the theory of radical vagueness untenable. 
V.2. Radical ambiguiíy 
The opposite logical extreme frorn radical vagueness would be radical ambiguity. Instead of the 
lower lirnit of zero arnbiguity and full vagueness, this theory adopts the upper lirnit of ambiguity 
(homophony) allowed by UG. Then, sornewhat pretheoretically, we can state the doctrine of 
radical arnbiguity as in (9). 
(9) Radical ambiguity 
If there are n morphosyntactic contexts in which a string E appears which can be 
distinguished using the set of al1 morphosyntactic features provided by Universal 
Grammar, then E is n-ways arnbiguous; that is, E corresponds to n (listed or derived) 
lexical iterns. 
Under radical ambiguity, the so-called norninative/accusative of Old Icelandic neuter nouns 
actually corresponds to distinct forms, a nominative one and an accusative one. Informally, there 
are two singular words skip, not one, and two plural forms, for a total of four homophonous 
forms. 
However, radical ambiguity does not stop here. The theory demands that any humanly 
possible distinction is potentially encoded. We can use English words to illustrate. The 
distinction between DUAL and PLURAL is never encoded overtly on English nouns. However, UG 
provides us with these features. Therefore, the proponent of radical ambiguity would require that 
the string cats correspond to at least two feature structures, one marked as DUAL and one as 
PLURAL. In fact, there would be rnany, rnany more possible feature structures, including ones to 
encode different definiteness and case distinctions. 
V.3. Discussion 
It rnight be tempting to make Radical Vagueness slightly more plausible by factoring out clearly 
accidental homophony of lexical iterns like well, knighthight or (to).fly/(a).fly), assuming we 
could figure out how to do this in principled fashion. However, in the next section 1 show that 
there must be even more hornophony/ambiguity thanjust these clear cases. This discussion rnight 
then tempt us to embrace Radical Ambiguity. A moment's reflection should show that no 
O Servicio de Publicaciones. Universidad de Murcia. All rights reserved. IJES, vol. 1 ( l ) ,  2001, pp. 219-239 
L2 evidence for !he structure of the LI lexicon 23 1 
language interna1 evidence can lead us to reject Radical Ambiguity -we can always construct 
extensionally equivalent grammars that make use of various amounts of ambiguity. English will 
sound the same whether we model it with one or more lexical items you. At the end of the paper 
we will see how L2 data can bear on these issues, and we will find arguments that the truth lies 
somewhere between the two logical extremes. 
VI. ARGUMENTS FOR THE NECESSITY OF HOMOPHONY 
A reasonable goal of morphological analysis is to reduce the number of lexical items 
('morphemes' in a traditional sense) needed to account for the surface forms of a language. This 
goal entails demonstrating that a single form fulfills functions in the grammar which can be 
distinguished by the analyst. In practice, however, many morphologists recognize the existence 
of homophonous (ambiguous) forms. For example, the past tense of hit must contain a 
phonologically null past tense morpheme, since it surfaces as hit and not *hitted The problem 
is that no explicit mechanism has been proposed for deciding that hit is an ambiguous string (that 
is, it corresponds to two different morphological feature sets), whereas, say Old Icelandic skip 
is a non-ambiguous form, unspecified for case. This lack of explicitness is unacceptable in a 
formal theory, though we find it in a variety of frameworks from Distributed Morphology to 
Lexical Functional Grammar. 
While it is not the case that scholars who advocate broad use of vague representations 
deny the possibility ofhomophony, it is useful to demonstrate that homophony is present in cases 
more subtle than, say, English well, a string which corresponds to both a noun and an umeiated 
adverb, or knight and night. In this section, 1 present five distinct arguments that homophonous 
or ambiguous representations must be allowed in morphological theory. This evidence should 
serve to steer us further and further away from radical vagueness. 
VI.1. First argument: Blocking of productive morphology 
English has a productive marker of plurality in nouns: rodent-S, banana-S, linguist-s. Following 
early discussion of blocking in morphology (Aronoff 1976), the form feet can be said to block 
the derivation of Yoots. In other words the existence of a stored form FOOT-PLURAL prevents the 
concatenation of the independently listed F o o T  and PLURAL lexical items. 
A more interesting case is that of the 'irregular' noun sheep which could potentially be 
treated as ambiguously singular or plural (corresponding to two representations), oras unmarked 
with respect to number (Le., vague in interpretation). However, in this case, there must be a 
lexical item 'sheep [PLURAL]' in order to block the productive process of plural formation from 
generating *sheeps. Therefore, we can conclude that at least in some cases, forms which are 
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superficially ambiguous as to whether they are marked for a given category, are in fact 
ambiguous. Without a (possibly phonologically null) featural distinction, there is no mechanism 
available to block the productive morphology from generating *sheeps3. 
VI.2. Second argument: identical subsumption structures 
Vague representations must be formulated in such a manner that the features they contain are 
compatible with al1 the environments in which the representation is used. 1 assume that listing 
disjunctive subsets of features associated with a single phonological representation is a notational 
variant of positing distinct, homophonous representations. Vague representations, therefore, must 
contain, some subset (possibly not a proper subset) of the set derived by the intersection of the 
environments in which they can be used4. Depending on the set of features used and depending 
on whether an attempt is made to make representations as 'economical' as possible, theories of 
morphology have appealed to a principle, such as the Elsewhere Principle, that specifies which 
representation is chosen if more than one is compatible with a given context. We consider now 
potentially problematic cases for such a theory. 
Consider the paradigm in (10) which is typical of Old French masculine nouns. The 
example is the word 'wall'. 
(1 0) An Old French problem for vague representations 
We see that the nominative singular and oblique plural are both murs, whereas the oblique 
singular and nominative plural are both mur. Therefore, we have to recognize that the same 
phonological form corresponds to different feature specifications in these paradigms. 
To show that this is not an isolated case, a further example of this situation can be 
supplied by Scots Gaelic (Calder 1923: 81, 101). 
(1 1) A Scots Gaelic problem for vague representations 
SING. &ir 
PLUR. U i l  
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The nominative singular and genitive plural of the word for 'brood' have a so-called 'broad 
vowel' form, whereas the genitive singular and nominative plural show a 'slender infection' 
[sic]. 
We can now define the general case illustrated by these examples. Given a paradigm 
defined by contrasting pairs of features (or feature values) F and G, and A and B, the theory of 
vague specification runs into trouble if it is the case both (1) that the exponents of [F, B] and [G, 
A] are identical, say X, and (2) that the exponents of [F, A] and [G, B] are identical, say, Y: 
(12) A hypothetical problem for vague representations 
The positions filled by X correspond to [F, B] and [G, A], which means they share no features. 
Their intersections for the relevant features is the null set. The positions filled by Y are [F, A] 
and [G, B] which also share no relevant features and thus, their intersection for the relevant 
features [A, B, F, G] is also the null set5. So the underspecified 'vague' representations for X and 
Y are identical, both are the empty set.' Therefore, there is no way for the morphology to choose 
among them without resorting to disjunctions like "Choose Y if either [F] and [A], or [G] and 
[B]". This just moves the responsibility for keeping track of the correct form from the lexicon 
to an ad hoc rule of lexical selection. Given the fact that X and Y can, in principle, be 
morphologically complex and show the effects of phonological neutralizations, it is unclear how 
such a rule could be formulated. It is also impossible to choose X or Y as more marked, that is 
more specific, using set intersection as the procedure to determine which features each item is 
specified for. 
VI.3. Third argument: neutralization in morphophonologically definable contexts 
An example from English suggests further that the practice of collapsing homophones that share 
a 'significant' portion of their featural makeup is excessively superficial. Many dialects of 
English do not distinguish phonologically the possessive and non-possessive forms of regular 
plural nouns: the girls leji and the girls ' mother leji both contain the phonological string [grlz]. 
A theory that demands the collapse of subject and object forms of English nouns, would seem 
to require the collapse of the possessive and non-possessive plurals. Furthermore, it seems that 
we would also need to collapse the possessive singular form girl 'S which is homophonous with 
the other two. This leaves the form girl as the most marked member of the paradigm, requiring 
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explicit encoding of non-plurality and non-possessiveness -a conclusion we assume is odious 
to believers in markedness. Of course, one could conclude that this is exactly the point of 
markedness, and take such a case as evidence of the marked nature of bare noun stems like girl 
in English. Note, however, that this collapse will not be posited for cases like children 's. The 
analysis fails to capture the effects of accidental homophony. 
VI.4. Fourth argument: Lexical splits 
Toivonen (2000) demonstrates that the long-standing problem of the distribution of the Finnish 
possessive suffixes can only be solved by recognizing that the suffixes represent, in fact, pairs 
of homophonous forms. For the first and second person suffixes the argument is based primarily 
on principies interna1 to Lexical- Functional Grammar, the framework Toivonen adopts, though 
the conclusions may be compatible with other theories. In brief, in the absence of an independent 
pronoun the first and second person suffixes have a PRED feature and thus are pronominal 
suffixes, whereas when an independent pronoun is present the suffixes must lack a PRED feature. 
This avoids a PRED clash, since the pronouns have their own PRED feature. In such a case, the 
suffixes are merely agreement markers. For these persons, the representation of the agreement 
marker is contained in the representation of the form which has a PRED. 
The third person suffix -nsdnsa provides a further compelling demonstration. Toivonen 
shows that in the third person, in contrast to the first and second, the representations of the 
agreement marker and the form used without an independent pronoun are in fact distinct 
-neither representation subsumes the other. The agreement marker agrees only with a third 
person, HUMAN pronoun: 
(13) (a) Pekka nakee hanen ys~ava-nsa. 
P. sees histher friend-3Px 
'Pekka sees hisher friend' 
(b) *Pekka nakee hanen yslavan. 
P. sees hisher friend. ACC 
'Pekka sees hisher friend' 
(c) Pekka nakee pojan ystavan. 
P. sees b 0 y . c ~ ~  frien d.^^^ 
'P. sees the boy's friend' 
(d) *Pekka nakee pojan ystava-nsa. 
P. sees b 0 y . c ~ ~  friend-3Px 
O Servicio de Publicaciones. Universidad de Murcia. Al1 rights reserved. IJES, vol. 1 ( l ) ,  2001, pp. 219-239 
(e) Mina annan koira-lle sen ruokaa. 
1 give d o g . ~ ~ ~   GE GEN food 
'1 give the dog its food' 
( f )  Mina annan koira-lle sen ruokaa-nsa. 
1 give ~ O ~ . A L L   GEN food-3Px 
In (13a), the possessive suffix -nsa/nsa agrees with the third person, HUMAN pronoun hanen. In 
(b), the sentence is ungrammatical without the sufix. In (c), we see that no suffix is present when 
there is a full lexical NP possessor. In (d) the suffix is meant to agree with the full lexical NP 
possessor, which is obviously not a pronominal form-this is ungrammatical. In (e) there is a 
pronoun, but it is sen, which cannot refer to humans, so the sentence is grammatical without the 
suffix; and ( f )  is ungrammatical with the suffix, because of the non-human pronoun sen. 
In contrast to such cases, the sufixed pronominal form, which must be anaphoric with 
the subject, is not restricted to reference with humans. It can corefer with any third person even 
those that are non-human and non-animate, and its antecedent need not be a pronoun: 
(14) (a) Han nakee ystüva-nsa. 
He sees friend-Vx 
'He, sees his, friend' 
(b) Poika nakee ystava-nsa 
boy sees friend-Vx 
'The boy, sees his, friend' 
(c) Se heiluttaa hantaa-nsa. 
it wiggles tail-3Px 
'It, wiggles its, tail' 
Thus, the morphological features ofthe homophonous 3rd person possessive sufixes are distinct. 
Slightly simplifying Toivonen's discussion, we can represent the features of the agreement 
marker as in (1 5 ) :  
(1 5) Features of agreement marker -nsa/nsa 
HUMAN 
3rd 
PRONOUN AGREEMENT 
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And we can represent the features of the pronominal suffix as in (16): 
(16) Features of pronominal suffix -nsdnsa 
PRED 
SUBJECT ANTECEDENT 
3rd 
The surface form -nsdnsa is thus ambiguous -there are two homophonous forms. It is possible 
to list, say, a disjunctive statement of where the putative 'vocabulary item' -nsdnsa is inserted. 
However, this is equivalent to listing two separate items. 
VI.5. Fifth argument: Evidence for zero derivation 
It is well known that English has at least two verbsfly. One appears in sentences like That bird 
flies out of the barn whenever rhe cat comes in. Another appears in sentences like Thepitcher 
flies out to right Jeld every time he bats. The past tense of these verbs differ. The first 
corresponds to irregularflew, whereas the baseball term can only have the past tense formflied. 
Irregularness is a feature of roots, and the first verb is based on a verbal root which is linked to 
the irregularflew. The baseball verb, however, is (synchronically) productively derived fiom the 
nounfly (ball) and thus is not a stored form. For our purposes, what is relevant is the obvious 
point that despite their homophony and intuitive similarity in meaning, the two verbsfly must 
correspond to distinct representations. Therefore, the phonological formfly is ambiguous, not 
vague. 
VII. SOLVING THE LINGUIST'S PROBLEM-L2 DATA TO THE RESCUE 
It is now clear that there is some homophony, so radical vagueness is untenable. As mentioned 
above, we do not have any explicit algorithm for determining exactly how much homophony 
there is, yet it is intuitively wrong that English has distinct DUAL and PLURAL forms of every 
noun. We cannot come to a complete solution to the determination of how much homophony 
each language has and what principles determine this, but it seems that languages lie somewhere 
between the two logical extremes in the mapping between phonological strings and lexical 
entries. (See Reiss (2000) for discussion of explicit learning algorithms that differ in the amount 
of homophony that they lead to). In this section, 1 will just show how L2 data can bear on the 
issue of homophony in particular cases by helping us decide if a given phonological string 
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corresponds to one or more lexical entries. 
Since, for example, an Old Icelandic grammar with two distinct (homophonous) words 
pronounced skip will be extensionally equivalent in terms of the phonological strings generated 
to a grammar that contains a single vague item pronounced skip, intemal evidence can never be 
used to choose among the two (by definition). There is the possibility, however, of appealing to 
extemal evidence from SECOND LANGUAGE ACQUISITION (%A). 
The errors that SLA leamers make may reflect aspects of the L1. Consider the following 
(impressionistic) obsemations: speakers of a language like Hungarian, which does not distinguish 
gender in third person pronouns make many errors in using English he/she, whereas English 
speakers do not appear to have a problem leaming not to be able to distinguish the genders. If 
Hungarian o corresponded to two separate representations, one [3 SG MASC] and another [3 SG 
FEM], we might expect the mapping to the English system to be easier than it apparently is. 
Similarly, English speakers leaming Marshallese have a hard time leaming to make the 
DUAL/PLURAL contrast, so this may indicate that this distinction has been collapsed in English 
grammars. In other words, we can reject, on the basis of extemal evidence, the idea (Radical 
Ambiguity) that no collapse of initial full specification occurs. Hungarian speakers do not have 
two (or more) third person pronouns, and English speakers do not have a covert DUAL. So not 
every distinction allowed by UG remains encoded in every grammar. 
L2 data also provides further evidence some covert distinctions do exist. Do English 
speakers have a problem leaming distinctions like the French tu/vous contrast? My intuition is 
that they do not. If correct, this can be taken as evidence that distinctions that are made anywhere 
in the language, such as SINGULAR vs. PLURAL, are maintained in al1 relevant representations. In 
other words, the evidence from English speakers leaming French or Spanish suggests that 
English has at least two pronouns that are pronounced you. The question of whether there are 
more than two is discussed further in Reiss (2000). This conclusion may be contrary to the 
intuítions of many morphologists, but it is based on an explicit form of reasoning and can be 
empirically tested. Therefore, it should be taken seriously. 
Another example, is perhaps easier to swallow. In Italian, the string sono corresponds to 
both Iam and they are. Here, 1 think, the intuitions of linguists are in agreement that this case is 
one of accidental homophony, but it is not clear that this intuition has ever been justified. 
However, consistent with the intuition is the fact that Italian leamers of English will not confuse 
am and are, as we might expect them to if there were a one-to-two mapping from Italian lexical 
items to English ones. So, sono is ambiguous -it corresponds to two homophonous items in the 
Italian lexicon. 
The general point is just this: one-to-one and many-to-one mappings fromL1 to L2 are 
easier than one-to-many mappings. In other words, it is easier to map to the correct form if there 
is only one output choice than ifthere is more than one. The error pattems of L2 leamers can give 
us insight into the nature of the mappings, and thus into the nature of theLl grammar. 
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Only by taking issues of L2 acquisition into account, can we start to solve the Linguist 'S 
Problem of the indeterminacy of the data and arrive at a theory of how the Human S Problem is 
solved. Such simple arguments suggest that theoretical linguists would do well to consider L2 
data more carefully. 
NOTES: 
1. It is not even worth arguing about this assumption of the nativist hypothesis -nobody denies that there is something 
innate that makes us able to learn languages and does not allow chickens to do so upon comparable exposure. 
2. Note the same sloppy terminology is rampant in syntax. We considera sentence to have a hierarchical structure, as 
well as alinearorder. Therefore, sentences cannot bestructurally ambiguous,only strings can be structurally ambiguous. 
3. Of wurse, one could stipulate that the plural morpheme is linked to a listof roots which it cannot attach to. This kind 
of 'negative subcategorization' is typically not considered in generative analyses and we will not pursue the idea here. 
4. Given the likelihood that the relevant morphosyntactic features are organized somewhat, and not elements of an 
(unstructured) set, it would be more appropriate to talk about subsumption relations than mere subset relations. However. 
1 forego this (ultimately necessary) distinction here, for the sake of expository convenience. 
5. Obviously, the relevant lexical items, X and Y are specified, in fact they are identically specified, for further features 
not listed here. 
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